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to be at odds with God's will. Thomists have various strategies of response 
to this question, of course. But a theologian who is not convinced of the 
adequacy of these responses might be led to affirm that part of God's creative 
purpose for us is to grant us a limited freedom in relation to God as well as 
to one another. When talk of such freedom is motivated in this way, it is far 
from clear that it reflects a "theologically inexplicable" (p. 145) departure 
from the basic rules of Christian discourse. 
Given the limits of space, I have not commented here on Tanner's use of 
materials from the history of theology to illustrate her points. Her interweav-
ing of themes from Aquinas and Barth is particularly noteworthy, and she 
provides illuminating commentary on a number of past disputes (e.g., be-
tween Molina and Banez). One of the special contributions of this book is 
that it provides an outstanding model for the use of historical materials in 
exploring issues of contemporary importance in philosophical theology. 
Explanation/rom Physics to Theology: An Essay ill Rationality and Religion, 
by Philip Clayton. New Haven: Yale University, 1989. Pp. ix and 230. 
$26.50. ISBN 0-300-0435308. 
NANCEY MURPHY, Fuller Theological Seminary. 
Philip Clayton's Explanation from Physics to Theology is an intriguing book. 
It pursues a worthy goal in a highly competent manner. The goal is to counter 
the tendency of modern liberal theology to take theological assertions as 
anything but assertions (as expressions of religious feeling, or existential 
orientation, or as moral recommendations) by showing theology to be enough 
like science that whatever truth value science has must accrue to theology as 
well. He begins with an account of the history of philosophy of the natural 
sciences, since these are taken to be our best examples of rational explanation 
and warranted assertability. He then turns to the social sciences, whose con-
cern with questions of meaning has long been said to require an entirely 
different methodology. However, he concludes that the differences have been 
exaggerated-in both cases the essence of science is providing explanations. 
These must fit the explanandum into an accepted framework, and must be 
evaluated by means of a coherence criterion. This move puts him in a position 
to tackle religion, whose cognitive component is understood as a system of 
beliefs by means of which individuals and communities attempt to give mean-
ing to the whole of experience. Theology, then, is a discipline that seeks to 
discover and interpret systems of religious meaning and to assess the truth 
of the religion's theory about ultimate reality according to the canons of 
scientific explanation. 
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The team to beat today in establishing the cognitive claims of theology is 
the Yale school. Rightly or wrongly, the explication of theology provided by 
George Lindbeck, Ronald Thiemann, et. alia} as intratextual has regularly 
been read as the rejection of any attempt to establish the truth of Christian 
belief in any stronger sense than that of internal coherence. Clayton's book 
might be read as an argument to the effect that coherence, when construed 
broadly enough to include correspondence with the facts, is just exactly what 
scientific rationality (and truth) is all about. "Coherence," he says, "requires 
the systematic interdependence or 'fit' of the various components of an ex-
planatory account, both internally (call it the consistency criterion) and ex-
ternally-with the situation (pragmatic criteria), with the data implied and 
expressed by the explanandum (the correspondence criterion), and with the 
broader context of experience (the comprehensiveness criterion). "2 
This brings me to my criticism: is coherence in this sense all the scientist 
has to go on in evaluating proposed explanations? If so, we can scarcely ask 
more of theology. But has Clayton adequately summed up the best of current 
philosophy of science? I think not. He rightly represents the work of Imre 
Lakatos as the best theory to date of the rationality of science. Yet he over-
looks what I take to be the most important of Lakatos's contributions: his 
insistence on novel facts to confirm a research program. 
Lakatos is interested in distinguishing between "progressive" and "degen-
erating" research programs. A research program is a temporal series of theo-
retical systems where a core theory and a plan for development (called the 
positive heuristic) remain unchanged while lower-level "auxiliary" hypothe-
ses are added or modified in order to account for a growing domain of data. 
A degenerating research program is one in which the changes are all ad 
hoc-they are merely verbal changes that make the theory consistent with al-
ready-known data. A progressive program, on the other hand, is one where 
(occasionally, at least) the theoretical changes allow for the prediction and cor-
roboration of facts that would have been entirely unexpected on the basis of 
previous stages of the program. Such facts are Lakatos's prized "novel facts. "3 
The value of novel facts appears when one realizes that creating consis-
tency between theory and already-known facts is often more a test of the 
scientist's ingenuity than of the theory. Furthermore, as Paul Feyerabend 
points out, an older theory always has the advantage when coherence alone 
is the test, since scientists have had more time in which to learn to describe 
their observations in the terms of the older theory. The novel-facts criterion 
comes as close as possible to Karl Popper's goal of allowing nature to speak 
for itself in the evaluation of a theory. 
Clayton's playing down of Lakatos's criterion of progress leads him to miss 
a valuable opportunity to defend a holist account of theology similar to that 
of his Yale mentors against the charge of cultural (epistemic, linguistic) 
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relativism. And it needs to be so defended since the IU quoque argument 
("science, too, is based merely on coherence") fails.4 
Why has Clayton overlooked this opportunity? I speculate here. I suspect 
that the cause is his definition of religions as systems of meaning. Earlier 
theorists sought to locate religion in the sphere of meaning (or value, or 
practical reasoning) precisely to insulate it from facts. Following in his mod-
ern predecessors' tracks, Clayton is bound to find the idea of a religious/act 
suspect. Theological facts there may be-facts about first-order religious 
language and practice, for example. But without religious facts, there is 
nothing of an 'extratextual' nature against which to test the religion's theory 
of ultimate reality. All facts, by definition, belong to some other discipline. 
So at the core of Clayton's argument for the propositional (cognitive, sci-
entific) treatment of theology lies a contradiction-the acceptance of the 
modern social-scientific account of religion as a system of (non-proposi-
tional) meaning, which I suspect is the unrecognized cause of his failing to 
make the strong case he could have made with the philosophy-of-science 
resources at his disposal.s 
Nonetheless, this is an important and interesting book. If Clayton has not 
made the strongest case possible under the circumstances, he has still made 
a great stride in the right direction. I recommend it for anyone interested in 
the rationality of religion. 
NOTES 
1. See Lindbeck's The Nature of Doctrine (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984); and 
Thiemann's Revelation and Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1985). 
2. p. 48. 
3. See Lakatos's "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Pro-
grammes," in The Methodology of Scielltific Research Programmes: Philosophical Pa-
pers, Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 8-101. 
4. I have argued that theology, too, can be confirmed by means of novel facts. See my 
Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning, (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1990), chs. 5 and 6. 
5. I suggest that the very definition of religion that Clayton employs is incoherent. 
Religion is defined as the ultimate (highest, broadest) context for the understanding of 
experience (reality) as a whole. Yet the theorist is in making such a statement enunciating 
a theory of theories, a broader social-scientific context that relativizes all religions as mere 
instances. Social-scientific theories of religion, in the process of explaining religions as 
ultimate contexts of meaning, necessarily make social sicence 'religion' (in that sense) 
and reduce religions to something else. 
